




EUI Working Paper ECO No. 94/11
How Does the Hungarian 
Unemployment Insurance System  
Really Work?
Jo h n  M i c k l e w right 
and































































































3 0001 0015 5212 6
Please note
As from January 1990 the EUI Working Paper Series is 
divided into six sub-series, each sub-series is numbered 



























































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
EUI Working Paper ECO No. 94/11
How Does the Hungarian 




G y u l a  N a g y




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the authors.
© John Micklewright and Gyula Nagy 
Printed in Italy in April 1994 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




























































































How Does The Hungarian Unemployment Insurance System Really Work?
John Micklewright' and Gyula Nagy*
* Department of Economics, European University Institute, Florence, and Queen 
Mary arid Westfield College, University of London
* Department of Human Resources, Budapest University of Economics
December 1993
Abstract
Discussion of unemployment benefit in Hungary often takes place without 
adequate information on the functioning of the benefit system. We look at 
receipt of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit, using microdata drawn from 
administrative records of the benefit system. Taking a 10% sample of the 
stock of benefit recipients in March 1992, we analyse the distribution of 
benefit amounts and entitlement periods at that time and simulate the effect 
of changes introduced in 1993. Receipt is determined in a much more complex 
way than a casual look at the 'rules' might suggest. We also consider the 
impact of the income tax system and the relationship of benefit to both past 
and prospective earnings. We draw lessons for the analysis of unemployment 
benefit in other Eastern European countries in transition.
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The introduction of unemployment benefit in Hungary in January 1989 was 
an important early step in the transition of the Hungarian economy to a market 
system. As in other Eastern European countries, an economic system that 
guaranteed jobs is being replaced by one that guarantees unemployment benefit 
(subject to certain conditions) in the event of job loss. Payment of 
unemployment benefit therefore helps underpin economic reform.
While there may be general agreement on this principle throughout 
Eastern Europe, the practice of the provision of unemployment benefit is the 
subject of much debate. At the macro level there are concerns about the level 
of public expenditure involved, and about the balance with expenditure on 
active labour market policies. Our focus in this paper is on the micro 
level, where the impact of benefit on both living standards and incentives to 
work depends crucially on how benefit systems actually function. Comment on 
systems in Eastern Europe is typically based on a look at selected parameters 
rather than on information on actual payments. But Western experience 
indicates that benefit schemes often work in a way that is not obvious from 
a reading of the rules of the schemes. Rules may interact in complicated 
ways. There may be administrative discretion and error in the way that rules 
are applied. In particular, calculations of the hypothetical benefit 
entitlement for an "average" worker may give a very misleading impression of 
how the benefit system works on the ground.
In this paper we look at a large sample of microdata on actual benefit 
payments in March 1992 to investigate how the Hungarian system does in fact 
work. The reader's appetite for the analysis may be whetted by Figure 1, 
which shows the distribution of monthly UI payments in the data. The figure 
shows an enormous spike at one point. What kind of UI system produces such 
a distribution? Answering this question with the aid of data on actual 
payments sheds light on a number of issues, including living standards, 
incentives, and benefit administration. This allows discussion of reform of 
the benefit system in Hungary to be better informed than hitherto has been the 
case.
Our analysis is of a 1 in 10 sample of the stock of UI recipients on 20 
March 1992, a sample of 37,166 individuals. Registered unemployment at this 
time stood at over 9 percent of the labour force. (By the summer of 1993 it 




























































































of the UI system held by the National Labour Centre (NLC), which collects 
information on each spell of UI receipt and stores it in computerised form. 
These records include some basic socio-economic data together with all details 
of the UI payments and of the information that is needed for their calculation 
such as previous earnings. There is no information in the data on the 
unemployed who do not receive benefit (about 30 percent of the registered 
unemployed) nor do we know the household characteristics of benefit 
recipients, which are of considerable importance to discussion of both living 
standards and incentives. But the NLC data do have the advantage of providing 
precise information on benefit entitlements for a very large sample of 
individuals.1
Section 2 considers how benefit amounts are determined in the Hungarian 
UI system. We demonstrate (i) the enormous impact of rules that might have 
been assumed to apply to only "special cases", (ii) the impact of "hidden 
changes" in the legislation over time, and (iii) the effect of several 
important administrative practices. We also simulate the impact on 
entitlements of the 1993 reform of the UI system. Section 3 analyses the 
relationship of UI payments to wages, distinguishing between a backward­
looking calculation that measures replacement of past income and a forward- 
looking calculation that emphasises incentives to return to work. Section 4 
considers how the picture is changed by consideration of progressive income 
taxation and other deductions, the impact of which is is quite notable and 
which is influenced in the case of the tax system by administrative 
arrangements for the unemployed. Section 5 analyses periods of entitlement 
to benefit, an aspect of UI which has seen considerable emphasis in the recent 
literature on disincentives. Section 6 draws conclusions for the case of UI 
in Hungary and spells out lessons for discussion of unemployment benefit in 
Eastern Europe more generally.
2. THE ANATOMY OF THE HUNGARIAN UI SYSTEM
A stylised view of UI is that it pays x percent of past earnings for a 
maximum period of time of length y. While x and y are important parameters, 
an adequate description of UI rules in any country would go some way beyond
Like our data, the first annual wave of the TARKI household panel 
survey refers to March 1992 but contains less than 300 unemployed persons 




























































































these features (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991). The existence of maximum 
and minimum benefit levels, the definition of 'past earnings', and the 
treatment of voluntary quits and of recurrent unemployment are examples of UI 
scheme details that have an important bearing on payments. There is 
insufficient room here to give all relevant details of the Hungarian UI system 
but in Table 1 we give some information including values of the parameters x 
and y. (Amongst other things we neglect financing issues.) We focus on the 
scheme introduced in March 1991 (the '91 scheme'), and modified in January 
1992 (the '92 scheme') and January 1993 (the '93 scheme'). The basic form of 
the 91, 92 and 93 schemes is identical. The qualification periods for 
benefit, which depend on employment history in the previous 4 years, are the 
same, as is the structure of a falling x with time unemployed (there are two 
benefit "periods") and a y which varies with past employment history/
The first point to make about the table is that the rules of the 91 and 
92 schemes still determine the benefit payments of large numbers of the 
unemployed. The UI system in Hungary embodies the grandfathering principle; 
a claimant has his or her spell of benefit determined under the rules applying 
on the day of the claim. A person registering as unemployed in December 1992 
receives benefit under the rules of the 92 scheme and is not affected by the 
introduction a month later of the 93 scheme. The dynamics of unemployment in 
Hungary imply that "grandfathering" results in changes to the UI system taking 
a considerable time to take full effect. As in several other Eastern European 
countries, the high unemployment rate in Hungary has until now resulted from 
a low outflow rate rather than a high inflow rate (Boeri, 1993). Thus there 
is a considerable lag before any new rules apply to the majority of the stock. 
No less than two-thirds of our March 1992 sample of the stock of UI recipients 
were still receiving benefit under the terms of the 1991 rules. We have also 
checked a sample from the register for April 1993. Only 1 in 5 persons 
received under the 93 scheme rules, the remaining 80 percent receiving under 
the 91 or 92 rules. The 1992 and 1993 revisions to the basic scheme appear 
largely to have been made to try and contain rising costs, but the 2
2 In addition to UI, the 91 scheme introduced a flat-rate "Career 
Beginner's" benefit for young people joining the labour market while the 92 
scheme introduced a means-t.ested "Social Benefit" for those exhausting their 
entitlement to UI. In March 1992 there were around 20,000 recipients of these 
two benefits compared to around 370,000 UI recipients. We focus exclusively 
on UI. Finally, there is a mandatory redundancy payments scheme which pays 
up to 6 months' wages for those with lengthy periods of service with their 




























































































grandfathering of entitlements has clearly delayed the full impact on benefit 
expenditure.
The second point to note about Table 1 is that the rules determining 
benefit payments for claimants with low earnings have an enormous impact. For 
simplicity we describe the arrangements in the 92 scheme. If application of 
the relevant x value (benefit/earnings ratio) produces a monthly benefit 
figure less than the minimum wage then benefit is set equal to the latter. 
But if the past earnings fall below the minimum wage then benefit is set equal 
to past earnings. This rule (and that relating to the maximum) results in the 
schedules relating benefit to wages having the piece-wise linear formulae 
illustrated in Figure 2 and implies that the benefit/earnings ratio depends 
on the previous level of earnings as well as the benefit "period". The thick 
solid line relates to a person in "period 1" of the 92 scheme, the first % of 
the total entitlement period at that time. (The thin lines represent the 93 
scheme, which we discuss below.) When earnings are more than 2.86 times the 
minimum wage there is a flat segment representing the maximum benefit level. 
There is a second flat segment when earnings are between 1.0 and 1.43 times 
the minimum wage. Here benefit is paid at the level of the minimum wage. The 
two sloping segments represent the formal x value of 70 percent and the 100 
percent rate that applies when earnings are beneath the minimum wage. The 
thick dashed line shows how the schedule is modified in "period 2" when x is 
lower. The flat segment where benefit is paid at the minimum wage is 
substantially larger and maximum benefit is not attained until previous 
earnings are four times the minimum wage.
The formulae define four benefit "regimes": (i) benefit beneath the 
minimum wage, (ii) benefit at the minimum wage, (iii) benefit at the formal 
x rate and, (iv) benefit at the maximum level. What is the relative 
importance in practice of each regime? Suppose that the incidence of 
unemployment was evenly distributed across the earnings distribution. Using 
data on the distribution of earnings in Hungary in September 1992 we assume 
that (a) benefit is determined by current earnings (rather than earnings in 
the previous 4 complete quarters), and (b) benefit is determined by the 92 
scheme period 1 rules.3 We estimate the following distribution of regimes:
3 These data are from a large scale survey conducted by the Hungarian 
CSO of the earnings of persons working full-time for employers with 50 or more 





























































































below minimum wage 
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The x rate of 70 percent in the 92 scheme would apply in just over half of 
cases and the next most important regime would be the maximum benefit level. 
However, these calculations are a poor guide to the actual distribution of 
regimes amongst UI recipients, as may be seen from Table 2. Two-thirds of our 
sample of recipients in March 1992 receive benefit at the level of the minimum 
wage or less - 43 percent at the minimum and 23 percent below the minimum. 
Only 2 percent receive maximum benefit and slightly less than a third receive 
benefit determined by the x applicable to the period (70 percent or 50 
percent). The period 1 and period 2 values of x are often the focus of 
discussion of the Hungarian UI system but by themselves they determine the 
benefit of only a minority of claimants. The majority have their benefit 
determined by the provisions relating to the minimum wage. The explanation 
for the shape of Figure 1 is now clear - the large spike reflects payments at 
or near the level of the minimum wage. Since benefit is a higher proportion 
of earnings for those in the bottom two regimes, one implication of Table 2 
is that the Hungarian UI system redistributes income rather more than many 
people may realise.
There are some notable differences in the distribution of the sample 
across regimes by entitlement period and benefit scheme and by gender. (There 
are no 92 scheme recipients in period 2 since no period 1 entitlements could 
have been exhausted between 1 January 1992 and our 20 March sample date; we 
exclude a negligible number of recipients under the 1989 rules.) Payments at 
or below the minimum wage occur for over 90 percent of claimants in period 2 
of the 91 scheme. The same proportion of claimants in the 91 scheme period 
1 and those in the 92 scheme (all of whom are also on period 1) are at or 
below the minimum - 63 percent - but in the 92 scheme there are more in the 
lowest regime. Only 15 percent of men have benefit beneath the minimum wage 
compared to 35 percent of women and over 80 percent of women are at or below 
the minimum.
Why do the patterns in Table 2 occur? The principal reason for the 




























































































unemployment on persons from the lower part of the earnings distribution. 
This has a big impact on the distribution of regimes since the overall 
distribution displays only moderate dispersion (the Gini coefficients for the 
September 1992 data are 0.31 for men and 0.29 for women). Median earnings for 
women in the overall distribution in September 1992 were little more than 
double the minimum wage and only 2.5 times the minimum for men. So any 
concentration of unemployment on the lower paid makes the bottom two regimes 
very important since a figure of about 1.5 times the minimum wage represents 
their upper boundary. Just over half of our sample of UI recipients have a 
previous earnings figure of less than 1.5 times the minimum wage in force on 
the date they last worked. This compares with only 1 in 6 of the employed in 
September 1992. Over 10 percent of the unemployed had earnings beneath the 
minimum wage when last employed compared to only 2 percent of the employed 
(something that need not reflect a flouting of the legal minimum). And since 
women are lower paid on average a greater number of women receiving UI have 
benefit at or beneath the minimum wage. The importance of the bottom two 
regimes is an inevitable consequence of adjusting the benefit formula for the 
lower paid in an economy with only moderate earnings dispersion.
A contributory reason for the importance of the provisions surrounding 
low levels of benefit is the lack of indexing in the benefit calculations. 
It is common for discussion of UI schemes to refer to benefit being a fraction 
of "previous earnings" without explicit recognition of the period over which 
these are defined. The base period in the 91 scheme was the last month of 
work prior to the UI claim. (This may not immediately preceed UI receipt due 
intervening periods of sickness, military service etc, or to a suspension of 
benefit due to voluntary quitting - see Table 1). In the 92 and 93 schemes 
the base period is the last four complete quarters. In no scheme has there 
been indexing of base period earnings to allow for wage inflation (around 25- 
30 percent annually in 1990-92) nor is there indexing of benefit payments 
during a spell, except via changes in the minimum wage.' We estimate that if 
benefit were based on the previous earnings figure indexed to March 1992 then 
the proportion of the sample in the bottom two regimes would fall from 66 
percent to 53 percent.
The effect of a change in the base period in the 92 scheme is something
If the minimum wage is raised during unemployment then existing 
UI payments at or below the minimum were raised proportionately in the 91 and 




























































































that we can detect empirically in the data. We estimate OLS regressions of 
the log of the previous earnings figure used by the NLC in benefit 
calculations, entering explanatory variables for years of schooling, age (and 
its square), months since last employment, a Budapest dummy, and a dummy for 
receipt under the 92 scheme. The equations are estimated separately for men 
and women and are restricted to those individuals in the March 1992 stock with 
a date of last employment on or after 1 October 1991. The variable for months 
since last employment is present to pick up the impact of wage inflation in 
producing different earnings figures for persons with different dates of job 
loss. The 92 scheme dummy is entered to see if, holding other things equal, 
previous earnings for individuals receiving under this scheme are indeed 
lower. Each month since the date of last employment is estimated to reduce 
previous earnings by 2.5 percent for men and 2 percent for women. However, 
holding constant the date of last employment, 92 scheme recipients have 
previous earnings that are lower by 11-12 percent, which we take as evidence 
of the effect of the change in base period.
The change in base period represented a reduction in the generosity of 
benefit. This type of change is much less obvious to the casual observer than 
changes in the benefit-earnings ratios or entitlement periods. But although 
the latter may be more evident in the sense that prominent scheme parameters 
are changed, the impact of such changes is not always easy to see. This is 
well illustrated by the reforms of January 1993. The 93 scheme changed 
entitlement periods, formal benefit/earnings ratios, provisions surrounding 
lower levels of benefit, and the treatment of voluntary quits (see Table 1). 
Without simulation of their collective impact on entitlements with a sample 
of microdata it is difficult to come to any view as to the overall effect.
To guage the effect of the 1993 changes we apply the new rules to 
everyone in the March 1992 stock. (This exercise does not of course 
correspond to what happened to existing benefit recipients on 1st January 
1993; the grandfathering of existing claims means that the 93 scheme rules 
have been applied only to new claims beginning in 1993.) The first result is 
a reduction in the size of the stock of UI recipients by 16 percent. Two 
factors produce this effect. First, the increase in the waiting time for 
benefit to 6 months in the event of a voluntary quit affects almost half of 
job quitters receiving benefit in March 1992. Second, entitlement to UI of 
all those in the 91 scheme period 2 would cease immediately; the total 





























































































The impact on benefit levels is more complex. The benefit formulae in 
the 93 scheme are illustrated by the thin lines in Figure 2. The formal 
benefit-earnings ratio rises in both entitlement periods but many claimants 
would find that the changes in the lengths of the entitlement periods shifted 
them out of the substantially shortened higher-ratio period 1 into the lower- 
ratio period 2. We calculate that this happens to about half of claimants in 
period 1 in March 1992 and among the other half there are many in the bottom 
two regimes who experience no increase or who suffer a fall - see Figure 2. 
Overall, and leaving aside those who have no entitlement remaining under the 
new rules, 16 percent of the sample experience a rise in benefit, 10 percent 
stay unchanged, while benefit falls in the remaining 74 percent of cases.5 
The mean change in benefit is a fall of 5 percent.
Finally in this section we highlight two administrative details of the 
Hungarian UI system. Administrative practices may have an important effect 
on benefit receipt but can rarely be gleaned from reading the relevant 
legislation.
First, nearly 1 in 8 of the March 1992 stock are persons who had 
received benefit under the original scheme introduced in 1989 and who had been 
able to switch directly to receipt under the 91 or 92 schemes on expiry of 
entitlement without an intervening period of work. The 91 and 92 scheme rules 
concerning work history in the four years prior to claim appear to have been 
applied without regard to the fact that entitlement under an earlier set of 
rules had just ceased. This seems outside the spirit of the system, since the 
individuals concerned are able to extend a total entitlement period to benefit 
which exceeds that in any individual scheme. (Since benefit in March 1992 is 
based on the earnings in the job held before receipt under the 89 scheme, the 
individuals concerned are disproportionately concentrated in the bottom 
benefit regime.)
In making the calculations we have modelled the effect of 
changes in the provisions relating to low benefit levels by multiplying the 
minimum wage in March 1992 by 8600/9000, which is the ratio of the key figure 
to the minimum wage in February 1993. Similarly, we have modelled the new 
maximum benefit amounts in the 2 periods of the 93 scheme by multiplying the
1992 minimum wage by the ratio of the levels of the new maxima with respect 
to the new minimum of 8600 forints. One feature we have not attempted to 
model is the difference in the base period for earnings between the 1991 and
1993 schemes (the base periods for earnings in the 92 scheme are the same as 




























































































Second, if a person did not work in any of the four complete calendar 
quarters prior to the UI claim under the 92 (or 93) scheme, then the practice 
is to impute a figure that is often higher than the historic last job earnings 
figure. We calculate that imputation occurred in nearly 1 in 7 cases of 
receipt under the 92 scheme in our sample. Not surprisingly, many of these 
persons (about half) are benefit 'switchers' from the 89 scheme who in this 
case profit from the use of the imputed wage figure on top of the extended 
entitlement resulting from 'switching'.
This section has shown that receipt cf benefit in Hungary is determined 
in a much more complex way than a casual glance at the 'rules' might suggest. 
The special provisions for individuals with low previous earnings, the lack 
of indexing of previous earnings, and certain administrative practices in the 
scheme, combine to make the more prominent formal parameters a limited guide 
to the scheme's outcomes.
3. REPLACEMENr RATES
The use of replacement rates to measure the generosity of benefit 
payments has figured prominently in the literature on unemployment benefits. 
At the same time, the concept is not always made clear and the term has been 
used to describe different sorts of calculations. First, there is the issue 
of whether the calculation is backward- or forward-looking. The former, 
measuring income when unemployed to that when last in work, is relevant to 
assessing the role of unemployment benefit in supporting past living 
standards. The latter, comparing income when unemployed to that which could 
be received on the return to work, is relevant to measuring the disincentives 
produced by a benefit system. We make calculations of both.
The second issue is the definition of income taken into the 
calculations. We define the replacement rate as the ratio of UI payment to 
main job earnings. This definition is restrictive. Whether employed or 
unemployed, living standards will be affected by all income sources of the 
claimant and of other members of the household (providing there is some income 
pooling among household members). Similarly, ail but the simplest mode; of 
job search behaviour accords a place to sources of income other than 
unemployment benefit and main job earnings (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1985, 
chapter 5). Western literature on incomes of the unemployed tends to 




























































































spouse. Discussion of unemployment benefit in Eastern Europe on the other 
hand often speculates on the role of supplementary "second economy" income 
(legal or illegal) which is particularly common in Hungary. The effect of 
second economy income is not obvious. It may be tied to the main job, and in 
this case our calculations may understate the income loss resulting from 
unemployment (UI being based on the main job earnings only). Or it may 
continue during unemployment, which would have an upward effect on replacement 
rates. Our data include nothing about second economy income or other sources 
of income in the household (we do not even know the marital status of 
claimants).
Thirdly, there is the issue of the tax treatment of benefit and of 
earnings. We focus in this section on the gross amounts of both income 
sources. In the next section we consider the impact of deductions due to tax 
and other reasons.
Backward-looking calculations
For our backward-looking calculations we take the ratio of benefit to 
the past earnings figure used to calculate benefit, having indexed the latter 
to March 1992, the date of our stock sample.6 The purpose of the indexing is 
to show the benefit received relative to previous earnings, had the latter 
moved in line with the national average - in other words the level of the 
current earning power of the previous job that is replaced by the current 
benefit payment.
Table 3 gives results in the form of the mean and standard deviation for 
each combination of benefit scheme and benefit 'regime' in March 1992. The 
importance of the indexing for obtaining a sensible picture of earnings 
replacement is shown most clearly by the separate values for the first and 
third regimes. Those in the third regime, with earnings below the minimum 
wage at the time of claiming UI, have a mean of 86 percent, not 100 percent, 
despite their benefit having been set equal to the level of their previous 
earnings. Those in the second regime, receiving at nominal benefit/wage rates 
of 70 or 50 percent, have means of 62 and 60 percent respectively in period 
1 (nominal rate 70 percent) of the 91 and 92 schemes and 38 percent in the 91
6 We used a monthly index of changes in average wages between the month 
of last employment and March 1992. For 92 scheme recipients we indexed from 




























































































scheme period 2 (nominal rate 50 percent). Those few persons with maximum 
benefit payments have a mean of 51 percent while those receiving benefit at 
the level of the minimum wage have a mean of 76 percent. (Had we not indexed 
the previous earnings the overall mean rate would have been 13 percent points 
higher at 86 percent.)
The table implies that there is substantial variation in replacement 
rates within as well as between regimes. Figure 3 shows the variation more 
directly and graphs the distributions separately for men and women, 
disaggregating also by age. The device used is a 'box-and-whiskers' plot; the 
bottom and top of the 'box' for each age group represents the upper and lower 
quartiles of the replacement rate for individuals of that age. The horizontal 
line dividing the box indicates the group median. The 'whiskers' attached to 
the box either have length equal to the 1.5 times the inter-quartile range or 
extend to the last observation in the distribution, whichever point comes 
first. In the former case the values of the replacement rate for the 
remaining outlier observations are marked (each point represents more than one 
individual). The width of each box is proportional to the number of persons 
in the age group.
The very small group of teenage men receiving UI have a median of 84 
percent (and almost three-quarters have rates of 70 percent or more). The 
median then falls sharply with age and all age-groups 25-29 and above have a 
a median close to 65 percent. But there is significant variation within each 
age-group - the inter-quartile range is typically about 15 percent points 
(higher in the bottom two age-groups) and the size of the 'whiskers' on each 
box show that there is further substantial variation at all ages. The greater 
concentration of women in the bottom two benefit regimes (at, and below, the 
minimum wage) is reflected in a substantially higher median replacement rates 
in each age-group other than for teenagers. The overall median is 77 percent 
compared to 65 percent for men. The interquartile range is also larger - 
nearly 25 points for most age groups.
Forward-looking calculations
The disincentives for the unemployed to search for new work or to accept 
job offers are best measured by the ratio of benefit to prospective rather 
than past earnings. The theoretical concept here is the mean of the wage 




























































































here should be taken as illustrative rather than definitive. Our proxy is the 
fitted value from regressions estimated with our data of previous (indexed) 
earnings. We then calculate the ratio of UI to this figure. These 
calculations show the ratio of benefit to the earnings that we predict a 
person of the same sex would receive who was living in the same county with 
identical schooling, age, and occupation.
The regressions are run using earnings of individuals who are in general 
job losers (less than 10 percent of the sample entered unemployment as a 
result of a quit). Moreover, many of the jobs concerned may have disappeared 
forever as the result of economic restructuring. The wages associated with 
them, and hence our predicted earnings from the regressions, may not be an 
accurate guide to the average wage offers that might be received by our sample 
of unemployed persons.'
The regressions are reported in the Appendix and are estimated for those 
with a last date of employment on or after 1 October 1991. The equations are 
estimated separately for men and women and include as an explanatory variable 
a cardinal index of occupation that is the log of average earnings (taking men 
and women together) in the individual's 4 digit occupation in May 1992. 
(These earnings figures are taken from a separate NLC survey of employed 
workers.) In including this variable we are not assuming that the individual 
restricts his job search to the same narrowly defined occupation that was held 
previously. Rather we hope that it measures an ability to achieve 
occupational success in the labour market that may be repeated in the future.8 
The variable has a powerful effect in the regresssions - a 10 percent rise 
in occupational earnings is estimated to result in a 5 percent rise in actual 
earnings. But it is far from the case that including the occupational 
earnings variable results in a near perfect fit - only a quarter of the 
variance in log earnings is explained in each case. The estimated county 
effects confirm important regional differences in earnings in Hungary (the
We ran regressions with the same specification for the (much 
smaller) sample of employees in the first wave of the TARKI household panel 
(held in Spring 1992). (Due to differences between the two sources we had to 
use net earnings figures in both regressions and to exclude individuals in 
certain counties from the NLC data.) Most coefficients were very similar 
although we do formally reject the hypothesis of equality of parameters across 
the two samples.
8 Of course, there may be many instances where actual occupational 




























































































base is Budapest) which suggests that any disincentive effects of benefits may 
vary geographically.9
Table 4 reports means and standard deviations of forward-looking 
replacement rates with denominators calculated from these regressions. The 
calculations are made for different ranges of backward-looking replacement 
rate and benefit regime. The highest mean forward-looking rate, over 100 
percent, is found for the regime in which there are the few persons receiving 
benefit at the maximum level, more than three-quarters of whom have backward­
looking rates of less than 60 percent. The regime with the lowest mean 
forward-looking rate, 62 percent, is where previous earnings were beneath the 
minimum wage at the time of claiming UI; in this regime two-thirds of 
claimants have backward-looking rates of 80 percent or more. And in every 
range of backward-looking rate the mean forward-looking rate is between 70 and 
75 percent, although the standard deviations show that there is substantial 
variation in each case.
It is clear that there is no close correspondance between the backward- 
and forward-looking rates that we have calculated. This of course is due to 
the relatively low explanatory power of our earnings regressions - they 
explain well neither the unusually high previous earnings of people receiving 
maximum benefit nor the low earnings of people below the minimum wage. The 
previous earnings figure reflects unobserved influences on earnings that may 
be expected to continue - an individual "fixed effect". On this view, the 
calculations we made of backward-looking replacement rates would in addition 
serve well as forward-looking rates aimed at measuring incentives to work. 
On the other hand, arguments stressing mobility within a labour market might 
suggest that such fixed effects are likely to be small and that the earnings 
figure predicted on the basis of schooling, age and occupation may give a 
better guide to prospective earnings. Earnings mobility may be particularly 
high in a transforming economy.
Although our regressions may give only a rough indication of the mean 
of the wage offer distribution, the comparison of forward- with backward­
looking rates serves as a reminder that transition between jobs via a spell 
of unemployment may involve substantial changes in earnings. And the
9 If we exclude the occupational earnings variable, the main effect on 
the equations is a doubling in the size of the estimated college and 
university effects. (R-square declines by about 6 percent points.) If years 
of schooling is entered instead of the level variables the rate of return is 




























































































discussion illustrates too that it is not obvious for whom the UI system 
produces the least incentive to work. It is a matter for judgment as well as 
factual evidence.
4. DEDUCTIONS FROM BENEFITS AND EARNINGS
To this point we have considered only gross benefits and earnings but 
account needs to be taken of deductions that are levied at source by 
employment offices paying benefits and by employers paying wages. Both 
earnings and UI payments in Hungary are subject to social insurance 
contributions and personal income taxation, and in addition alimony payments 
may be deducted at source. Like UI, a personal income tax is typically a new 
phenomenon in the transition economies of Eastern Europe (that in Hungary was 
introduced in 1988) and it is important to consider the interaction of the 
two.
The effect of social insurance contributions is unambiguously to 
increase replacement rates since the deduction rate when unemployed is lower 
than that when employed. Moreover, in each case the contribution is deducted 
at a single proportional rate so the effect is the same for all individuals. 
In 1992 the employed paid a 11 percent social insurance contribution on all 
earnings while the unemployed paid a 6 percent rate on all benefit.10 
Allowing for these deductions, the median backward-looking rates of the 
previous section would rise about 3^ points for men and over 4 points for 
women - see Table 5.
Alimony payments are deducted from benefit for a surprisingly large 
number of men - 8 percent overall and nearly 15 percent of men aged 35-44. 
(Less than 1 percent of unemployed women pay alimony). The average deduction 
rate is over 20 percent. If the same cash amount were also deducted at source 
from earnings then the effect in this case would be to lower replacement rates 
for the individuals concerned (except for those persons for whom benefit 
exceeded earnings). We calculate that the median backward-looking replacement 
rate for those paying alimony would fall by about five points.
The effect of personal income tax is the hardest to describe and 
illustrates well the difficulties of adequately representing the UI system.
Formally the deduction for the employed is made up of a 10 percent 
for "social insurance" and 1 percent for unemployment insurance (2 perccent 




























































































On the face of it, the personal income tax system in Hungary would appear to 
raise average replacement rates. The system embodies the principle of 
independent taxation of husband and wife and in 1992 there were four marginal 
rates: 0, 25, 35, and 40 percent. Unless both benefit and earnings are too 
low to attract tax, the progressive structure implies that benefit will always 
be taxed at a lower average rate than earnings (assuming gross benefit is less 
than gross earnings). (The progressive structure also implies that it is only 
with microdata that the distribution of actual tax liabilities can be 
deduced.)
We estimate that tax would be due on previous earnings (indexed to March 
1992) for 88 percent of men and for 68 percent for women, whereas in the case 
of UI payments we estimate only 40 percent of men and 17 percent of women to 
be liable to tax. Although the average tax rates are in general modest - the 
mean values are 10 percent on earnings and 6 percent on benefit for men and 
7 percent and 5 percent for women - an allowance for the tax system clearly 
does alter the picture for the majority of both men and women. Table 5 shows 
that the allowance for taxation raises the median male backward-looking 
replacement rate by 7 points compared to the situation where only social 
insurance is taken into account while the female rate rises by about half this 
figure. Allowance for both social insurance and taxation has brought the male 
median up by nearly 11 points. The gap between male and female rates is 
reduced by income taxation and the distributions for both genders are 
compressed somewhat.
These calculations assume that deductions at source from benefit made 
by employment offices follow the same procedure followed by employers for 
earnings. In the latter case, employers gross-up the monthly earnings figures 
to an annual basis, apply the tax formulae (which relate to annual income) and 
deduct the monthly equivalent from the earnings on behalf of the Ministry of 
Finance. This is known as "advance tax". Each individual then files a tax 
return at the end of the tax year and this may lead to an end-of-year 
adjustment. However, employment offices do not deduct advance tax from UI 
payments, except when the claimant requests it, or until cumulative benefit 
during the spell reaches the minimum annual threshold for the 25 percent 
marginal tax rate. Moreover, if the employment office does deduct advance tax 
it does so at a higher rate than if the person had been employed with earnings 
at the same level of the benefit. There is no obvious incentive to ask for 




























































































free loan in this case (due to the excessive rate applied) but extends a loan 
to the end of the year if no deduction is made.
Inspecting the data we find that tax deductions from benefit are 
recorded in less than half of cases where we calculate that tax would be due 
if the employment offices followed the same procedure as employers. The 
comparison is complicated for those whose unemployment started in 1991 since 
the tax data in the files may cover that year as well. It is notable that 
among those men unemployed three months or less in March 1992, a tax deduction 
from benefit is recorded in the data in less than 10 percent of cases whereas 
our calculations in Table 5 involve a deduction in over 40 percent of cases.
The procedure followed by the employment offices implies that in many 
cases, and most apparently among those unemployed only a short time, the 
claimant receives UI gross of tax despite there being a positive tax liability 
on an annual basis. Where this occcurs, current monthly income from UI in 
relation to net monthly income from earnings were a job to be held is higher 
than if the employment office were to deduct advance tax in the same manner 
as employers. This applies only to the short-term monthly picture since at 
the end of the year any tax due on benefit must be paid, but if the individual 
discounts the future at a significant rate then the distinction may be an 
important one for behaviour.
Consideration of deductions from benefit and earnings alters the picture 
of the relationship between the two at any one time. It does so in a way that 
is not entirely straight forward but the basic effect is clear - the gross 
figures understate income replacement. In addition the picture over time will 
has also been affected due to the repeated changes in social insurance and 
income tax rates that have occured in Hungary. Finally, comparison of the 
Hungarian UI system with those in other countries is affected due to cross­
country differences in tax and social insurance systems.
5. DURATION OF ENTITLEMENT
The importance of considering the duration of entitlement as well as the 
level of unemployment benefit has been emphasised in recent literature on the 
disincentive effets of UI (e.g. Katz and Meyer, 1990). A concern with living 
standards of the unemployed should also lead us to look beyond the current 
income provided by benefit and consider how long the benefit is paid for.




























































































of possible entitlement periods. Which periods are important in practice must 
be determined by looking at data on individuals' entitlements. Figure 4 shows 
the distribution of total days of entitlement (including those already used) 
for our stock sample, distinguishing between men and women. We also 
distinguish between the 91 and 92 schemes; the rules of the latter cut 
entitlement periods by a third (we exclude the few persons on the 89 scheme).
The most obvious feature of the distribution is that the modal 
entitlement period in both schemes is the maximum possible number of days, 2 
years in the 91 scheme and 1.5 years in the 92 scheme, something generated by 
4 continuous years of work prior to the claim for UI. This applies to about 
40 percent of the stock in the 91 scheme and somewhat less than 30 percent in 
the 92 scheme. High unemployment is a recent phenomenon in Hungary. As a 
consequence the modal group in the stock at present has a good employment 
history. If unemployment becomes concentrated in the future on those with 
poor work histories then shorter entitlement periods will become more 
prominent.
The second notable feature is that the entitlement periods of women 
appear no shorter than those of men. So although women on average receive 
lower benefit amounts due to their lower previous earnings, they do not have 
shorter entitlement periods. This reflects the high participation rate of 
women in Hungary. This said, the restriction of our data to the unemployed 
who do receive UI should be noted. Among the unemployed as a whole there may 
be more women than men who fail to qualify for benefit on account of their 
employment history.
Figure 5 gives the same information as Figure 4 in the form of the 
cumulative distributions, combining the sexes in this instance. The 
proportion of claimants with shorter entitlement periods is now more clear. 
Only about 10 percent in the 91 scheme and 15 percent in the 92 scheme have 
entitlement periods of 300 days or less. However, in interpreting these 
figures it is worth noting that the data include the benefit "switchers" whom 
we have identified - persons who appear to have exhausted benefit under the 
89 scheme but who have been able to switch to the 91 or 92 schemes. Their 
recorded entitlement periods in our data refer only to the 91 or 92 schemes 
and must inevitably be less than the maximum. (The period of receipt under 
the 89 scheme took place in the 4 years prior to a claim under the 91 or 92 
schemes.) If we exclude these persons (who make up 11 percent of the sample) 




























































































period rises to nearly 50 percent in the 91 scheme and over 30 percent in the 
92 scheme.
Table 6 shows the proportion with the maximum entitlement period by 
education, age and sex. We again exclude the benefit 'switchers' from this 
table and we do not distinguish between 91 and 92 schemes. The breakdown by 
educational level shows that even among claimants with incomplete primary 
education (nearly a tenth of the sample) the proportion with the maximum 
period is 30 percent. The small group with college or university education 
has the highest proportion of persons with maximum entitlement - just over a 
half. In the modal groups of vocational schooling for men and primary 
schooling for women the proportions are 39 percent and 38 percent 
respectively. The variations with age are not surprising. The maximum 
entitlement period is secured by at least 4 years of continuous work and the 
young are less likely to satisfy this condition. Only a fifth of those aged 
20-24 do so. Men aged 25-29 are notably less likely to have a maximum period 
than women of the same age (where the highest proportion with the maximum is 
found). One possibility for this is that although periods of military service 
(served only by men) are not taken into account in defining the 4 year period, 
the result of military service is to push the period over which employment 
history is considered back into late teens or early 20s, when the employment 
record is not so good.
Finally, we show in Figure 5 the cumulative distribution of remaining 
days of entitlement - the total days of entitlement (the focus of Figures 4 
and 5 and of Table 6) minus the days of benefit already received in the 
current unemployment spell. (This table includes the benefit 'switchers'.) 
The distribution marked "A" shows the actual position on 20 March 1992 - just 
over half of the stock of UI recipients had 400 days or more of benefit 
entitlement still to run and just under three-quarters had 300 days or more. 
The distribution marked "B" shows what would have been the 'over-night' effect 
of introducing the 1993 scheme rules had there been no 'grandfathering' of 
existing entitlement. A sharp reduction in the remaining days of entitlement 
is apparent. The negative values represent the 12 percent of the sample who 
would have lost Ul entitlement completely on account of their period already 
on benefit exceeding their new total entitlement. The median period of 
remaining entitlement among all claimants would be down to about 170 days. 
Only 1 in 10 of recipients would have 300 days or more left to run compared 




























































































from unemployment in Hungary is that shorter entitlement periods in the 1993 
scheme can be expected to result in much higher numbers of unemployed 
exhausting their entitlement to UI and then submitting a claim to means-tested 
social benefit.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis has shown the importance of looking at actual samples of 
unemployed people in Eastern European countries in order to understand how 
emerging UI systems work. A scheme's outcomes cannot be logically deduced 
from merely inspecting the most prominent "rules". This has implications not 
just for evaluation of labour market and income support policy in any one 
country, but also for attempts to compare unemployment benefit systems across 
the region, as in Burda (1993).
Our principal findings for Hungary are as follows.
Rules determining the benefit of claimants with low previous earnings 
have an enormous impact in practice. These applied in March 1992 to 4 
out of 5 women and more than 1 in 2 men.
Median ratios of gross benefit to gross (indexed) previous earnings in 
March 1992 were 65 percent for men and 78 percent for women, but the 
distributions displayed considerable dispersion. (The bottom decile 
for men was 53 percent and the top decile 90 percent, these being 
associated with high and low previous earnings respectively.) 
Allowance for deductions increased the medians by up to 10 percent 
points.
Aspects of the administration of the UI system and its relationship 
with the income tax system need re-examination. Nearly 1 in 8 of the 
March 1992 stock of benefit recipients were persons who seem to have 
been able to obtain extended entitlement to benefit by switching 
between successive benefit schemes. If the same procedures were 
applied by employment offices administering benefit as are applied by 
employers paying wages then tax would be deducted from the unemployed 




























































































The good employment histories of most people receiving UI in March 1992 
meant that the modal entitlement period to benefit was the maximum.
The "grandfathering" of existing claims when the rules change means 
that the legislative intent of reforms to the UI scheme (especially 
those relating to the duration of entitlement) has been considerably 
delayed in effect, on account of the low exit rate from unemployment. 
Only 1 in 5 persons with UI in April 1993 received under the rules 
introduced in January of that year.
While our results relate to Hungary, several of them are relevant to the 
debate on unemployment benefit in other Eastern European countries. A low 
turnover in the unemployed pool is found in a number of countries in the 
region (Boeri, 1993) which adds importance to the question of whether to 
grandfather existing claims when the rules change. It also means that 
reductions in entitlement periods can often be expected to bind in practice. 
The prominent impact in Hungary of rules relating to recipients with low 
previous earnings stems from the shape of the earnings distribution and the 
higher incidence of unemployment among the lower paid. An analogous impact 
of such rules may exist in other countries in the region with earnings-related 
schemes and a similar degree of earnings dispersion. Unemployment benefit is 
a new phenomenon in all countries in Eastern Europe and we would be surprised 
if all administrative problems of the various schemes have been satisfactorily 
resolved. Similarly, the interaction of unemployment benefit and new personal 
income tax systems is an issue which arises throughout the region. Measures 
of "backward-looking" earnings replacement in any country will be poor 
measures of the incentive to return to work at an individual level if a period 
of unemployment results in significant earnings mobility.
There are several issues relevant to the discussion of unemployment 
benefit that we have been unable to consider with the administrative microdata 
which we have used. These need investigation throughout Eastern Europe. We 
have not been able to study who qualifies for UI and who does not. We have 
been unable to look at the household circumstances of the unemployed. We have 
had no information on job search behaviour. These are all subjects which 
require investigation with household surveys and the collection and analysis 
of such data must be seen as a priority in the investigation of the unemployed 
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Table 1: Unemployment Insurance in Hungary
March 1991 ("91 scheme")
a) duration of entitlement varying from 6 to 24 months depending on 
employment record in last 4 years.
b) base earnings the last monthly basic wage plus bonus payments in the 
previous 12 months
c) benefit set at:
70% of earnings for 1st half of entitlement ("period 1")
50% of earnings for 2nd half of entitlement ("period 2")
d) if benefit calculated as less than the minimum wage, benefit is set 
equal to the minimum wage. However, if previous earnings less than the 
minimum wage then benefit set equal to previous earnings. Maximum 
benefit 3 times the minimum wage.
e) voluntary quitting results in a 3 month wait for benefit
January 1992 ("92 scheme")
a) "period 2" of entitlement cut by 50%.
b) base period for earnings the last 4 complete calendar quarters
c) maximum benefit 2 times the minimum wage.
d) where entry to unemployment is through job loss with severance pay
(introduced in January 1992) there is a waiting period for benefit
equal to the duration of severance pay (severance pay a maximum of 6 
months)
January 1993 ("93 scheme")
a) total duration of entitlement half that of 91 scheme (i.e. equal to 
length of 91 scheme "period 1").
b) benefit set at:
75% of earnings for 1st quarter of entitlement ("period 1")
60% of earnings for rest of entitlement ("period 2")
c) maximum benefit 18,000 forints per month in "period 1" and 15,000 in 
"period 2". If benefit calculated as less than 8,600 forints, benefit 
is set equal to 8,600. However, if previous earnings less than 8,600 
then benefit set equal to previous earnings. (Minimum wage equal to 
9,000 forints from 1 February 1993.)
d) waiting period following a voluntary quit extended to 6 months
Notes:
1) In each case we list only the changes made to the existing scheme.
2) Benefit is calculated as a % of gross earnings and is subject to income tax 




























































































Table 2: Benefit Regime bv Benefit Type

















91 scheme '91 scheme '92 scheme 
period 1 period 2 period 1
Total Total Total
3539 1487 3562 8588 3357 5231
41.2 17.3 41.5 100.0
17.6 34.2 28.1 23.1 15.2 34.9
9120 2555 4387 16062 9117 6945
56.8 15.9 27.3 100.0
45.4 58.8 34.6 43.3 41.3 45.3
7154 298 4312 11764 9050 2714
60.8 2.5 36.7 100.0
35.6 6.9 34.0 31.7 40.9 18.1
273 7 421 701 579 122
38.9 1.0 60.1 100.0
1.4 0.2 3.3 1.9 2.6 0.8
20086 4347 12682 37115 22103 15012
54.1 11.7 34.2 100.0




























































































Table 3: Mean Backward-Looking Replacement Rates
(10% of UI recipients in the '91 and '92 schemes, 20 March 1992)
Replacement rate defined as 100*(UI benefit/previous earnings indexed for 
average wage change to March 1992)
Means
(Standard Deviations)
Benefit I Benefit regime













































Note: We have excluded from the table 1,799 individuals in the 92 scheme for 
whom the date of last employment does not fall in the four complete quarters 
prior to UI claim since in this case the NLC imputes the last earnings figure 
and indexation of thhis makes little sense. Otherwise cell frequencies are 




























































































Table 4: Mean Forward-Looking Replacement Rates
(10% of UI recipients in the '91 and '92 schemes, 20 March 1992) 
Replacement rate defined as 100*(UI benefit/predicted earnings)









< min W min W > min W max ben Total
<60 53.3 64.5 76.6 99.1 
(14.4) (14.6) (21.6) (29.9) 




60-79 58.6 70.5 81.6 111.9 
(15.3) (14.3) (21.5) (31.8) 
















Total 62.1 72.4 80.3 101.2 j 73.1 
(16.7) (15.2) (21.6) (30.5) j (19.7) 
7996 15367 11113 664 \ 35140

































































































1) No Deductions from 53.2 65.2 90.0
benefit or earnings 
2) Social Insurance 
deducted
56.2 68.9 94.6







1) No Deductions from 
benefit or earnings
60.4 77.9 100.0
2) Social Insurance 
deducted
63.8 82.2 106.0





1. Social Insurance includes an unemployment insurance contribution in the 
case of earnings
2. Tax has been calculated on a full-year basis - see main text.




























































































Table 6: Maximum Entitlement Period by Educational Level. Age and Sex






with max. obs. 
eligib.
Percent No.of 
with max. obs. 
eligib.
incomp, primary 30.9 1859 30.4 1227
primary 32.4 6452 37.5 6386
vocational 38.9 8265 40.6 2738
vocational sec. 47.9 1847 49.0 1430
general sec. 39.5 626 46.9 1285
college, univ. 51.3 562 50.4 278
....... +.... ............... ... +















-19 0.3 313 1.1 265
20-24 19.7 3025 19.0 1403
25-29 34.0 2836 46.0 1626
30-39 40.4 5988 43.3 4399
40-49 42.7 4545 45.4 3713
50- 44.6 2904 37.0 1938
+---------------- +..............--+
Total | 36.9 19611 | 39.8 13344 |
Note:




























































































Appendix: Regressions of Loo of Previous (Indexed) Earnings
(UI recipients in 91 and 92 schemes with date of last employment on or after 1 
October 1991)
Men Women
Coef. t Coef. t
Constant 3.81 20.9 4.88 21.6
Schooling
primary (or less) .260 3.5 -.361 -2.8
vocational second. .079 5.9 .094 5.0
general secondary -.017 -0.7 .033 1.7
college .196 6.6 .316 7.6
university .269 7.1 .337 5.5
Age
age .032 9.4 -.005 -0.9
age squared/100 -.033 -7.6 .018 2.2
primary*age -.014 -2.9 .022 2.9
primary*age-sq/100 .013 2.1 -.036 -3.5
Average occupational .526 29.8 .461 21.6
earnings (log)
County
Baranya -.127 -5.5 -.146 -5.0
Bacs -.180 -9.3 -.197 -8.1
Bekes -.138 -6.8 -.180 -6.6
Borsod -.241 -13.2 -.271 11.6
Csongrad -.135 -6.1 -.204 -6.8
Fejer -.034 -1.5 -.075 -2.6
Gy or -.114 -4.6 -.164 -5.2
Hajdu -.166 -7.9 -.254 -9.8
Heves -.163 -6.9 -.216 -7.4
Komarom -.040 -1.7 -.139 -4.5
Nograd -.099 -4.2 -.287 -9.7
Pest -.067 -3.4 -.131 -5.4
Somogy -.185 -7.2 -.193 -6.1
Szabolcs -.282 -14.9 -.268 11.1
Szolnok -.147 -7.4 -.238 -8.8
Tolna -.179 -6.9 -.158 -4.7
V as -.200 -7.3 -.247 -6.9
Veszprem -.094 -4.0 -.174 -6.3
Zala -.259 -9.2 -.253 -7.3
Adj R-square 0.261 0.249

































































































Distribution of gross monthly benefits 










































































































Benefit Formulae in the 1992 and 1993 Schemes
















































































































Distribution of backward-looking replacement rate 
Males












16-19 25-29 35-39 45-49 55-59
20-24 30-34 40-44 50-54
Age
Females
120 -  
110 -  
100 *  1 
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Distributions ot total eligibility periods
Males in the 91 scheme Females in the 91 scheme














































































































Cumulative distribution of total eligibility period 
All U.I. recipients in the 1991 scheme
Eligibility period, days
Cumulative distribution of total eligibility period 






























































































Cumulative Distribution of Remaining Days of UI Entitlement
Days of remaining eligibility
Distribution "A": 
Distribution "B":
actual situation on 20 March 1992
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